Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other’s trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … important for realizing gains from trade. In contrast, under strong contract enforcement beliefs about other's trustworthiness … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and …

unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in …

unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in …

unique equilibrium, initial variations in trust have short-run effects only. Moreover, if we weaken contract enforcement in …

law", it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of … she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze how contract … find that economic incentives have a non-monotonic impact on behavior. Individuals perform a contract when enforcement is …