During patent litigation, pay-for-delay deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed...

• Pay-for-delay cases raise fundamental points of law, including the notion of (potential) competition and restriction by object.• According to the rich case law addressing the relationship between Article 101(1) TFEU and intellectual property – including Nungesser and BAT (Toltecs-Dorcet)...

We show that the incentive to engage in exclusionary tying (of two complementary products) may arise even when tying cannot be used as a defensive strategy to protect the incumbent's dominant position in the primary market. By engaging in tying, an incumbent fi rm sacrifices current pro ts but...

In this paper we examine the effect of cooperation between complementary incumbent monopolists on consumer welfare. While divided technical leadership makes it difficult for firms to integrate into complementary markets, firms induce entry in complementary markets by reducing the cost of entry...

This paper expands on an idea recently voiced by neo-Brandeisians and formally modelled by economists in the past two decades – namely, that the Chicago School’s arguments for the harmless and efficiency generating nature of vertical integration do not apply on zero-priced monetized markets....

Scholars and courts have long debated whether and when "parallel pricing" — adoption of the same price by every firm in a market — should be considered a violation of antitrust law. But there has been a comparative neglect of the importance of "parallel exclusion" — conduct, engaged in by...

Over the last years, several reports highlighted the market power of very large online platforms that are gatekeeping intermediaries between businesses and consumers, and the difficulty for classic competition policy tools to deal effectively with anti-competitive practices in these platforms....

Economic analysis of competition regulation is most developed in the domain of horizontal mergers, and modern agency guidelines reflect a substantial consensus on the appropriate template for merger assessment. Nevertheless, official protocols are understood to rest on a problematic market...

This paper explores the effects of communication in market entry games experimentally. It is shown that communication increases coordination success substantially and generate inferior outcomes for consumers when market entry costs are symmetric. Such effects are not observed when costs are...

We propose a methodology for estimating the competition effects from entry when firms sell differentiated products. We first derive precise conditions under which Bresnahan and Reiss' entry threshold ratios (ETRs) can be used to test for the presence and to measure the magnitude of competition...