This document analyses collusion by innovative firms and the role of patents in a continuous-time real options framework. A patent-investment race model is formulated in which innovative firms bargain and reach collusive agreements. It is shown that, while collusion always delays innovation, it...

This paper analyses collusion by innovative firms and the role of patents in a continuous-time real options framework. A patent-investment race model is formulated in which innovative firms bargain and reach collusive agreements. It is shown that, while collusion always delays innovation, it...

This paper addresses the issue of anticompetitive and collusive practices in a continuous-time real option framework. We extend the symmetrical duopoly under uncertainty model by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), by granting a patent to the first innovator that files an application. The...

A crucial aspect of debt restructuring is the redistribution of value among many diverse interests, differing in priority, collateral and bargaining power. Focusing on renegotiable debt contracts in a continuous-time framework, we characterise the U.S corporate bankruptcy renegotiation (Chapter...

Under U.S. Bankruptcy Code, equity holders can restructure different debt classes at a time. Recognizing this allows us to endogenize, in continuous time, not only the restructuring threshold but also the restructuring order of senior and junior classes. Unlike previous studies, sequential...

This paper investigates the uniqueness of subgame perfect (SP) payoffs in a sequential bargaining game. Players are completely informed and the surplus to be allocated follows a geometric Brownian motion. This bargaining problem has not been analysed exhaustively in a stochastic environment. The...