Richard Epstein has argued that governments should pay compensation for regulatory actions that impose costs on a subset of society. I develop a model in which there are two groups, one of whom benefits from a regulation, and one of whom bears the costs. A potentially biased government sets the...

Several empirical papers have established the fact of a negative price-output correlation for the United States in the post WWII era. Much of this work appears to interpret the sign of this correlation under the assumption that monetary policy is passive. This paper uses a simple aggregate...

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Andreoni (1998) shows that a small amount of seed money from the government can generate substantial additional private donations toward the provision of a public good, when there is a threshold level of provision below which no benefits are achieved. We argue that Andreoni's solution can be...

<link rid="b9">Esteban and Ray (2001)</link> model an increasing marginal cost of effort in providing a public good. If the marginal cost of contribution function has an elasticity greater than 1, then the level of provision is increasing in group size, regardless of the degree of rivalry of the public good. We...

We analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the <link rid="b8">Morgan (2000)</link> lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival...