This paper studies match formation and dissolution in frictional marriage markets under labor market uncertainty. We propose a search model with transferable utility in which ex-ante heterogeneous men and women simultaneously search for partners in the marriage market and switch between...

We present a generalization of the standard random-search model of unemployment in which firms hire multiple workers and in which the hiring process is time-consuming as well as costly. We follow Stole and Zwiebel (1996a,b) and assume that wages are determined by continuous bargaining between...

I propose a new mechanism for sluggish wages based on workers' noisy information about the state of the economy. Wages do not respond immediately to a positive aggregate shock because workers do not (yet) have enough information to demand higher wages. This increases firms' incentives to post...

I propose a new search-and-matching model in which wage rigidity and volatile unemployment endogenously arise. The Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model is generalized by incorporating job-ladder and vacancy-chain effects arising from on-the-job search and replacement hiring into a long-lived jobs...