We model an order book with liquidity rebates (make fees) and trading fees (take fees) that faces intermarket competition, and use the models insights to explain changes in market quality and market shares following changes in make-take fees. As predicted by our model, we document that fee...

This paper shows that a key driver of stock exchanges' competition on order-processing speeds is the Order Protection Rule, which requires an exchange to route its customers' orders to other exchanges with better prices. Faster exchanges attract more price-improving limit orders because the...

Economists usually assume that price and quantity are continuous variables, while most market designs, in reality, impose discrete tick and lot sizes. We study a firm’s trade-off between these two discretenesses in U.S. stock exchanges, which mandate a one-cent minimum tick size and a...

Regulators, exchanges, and politicians are considering reining in maker-taker pricing, which is used as a competitive tool by trading venues to acquire order flow. Examining the 2013 reduction in trading fees operated by BATS on its European venues, we document significant effects on market...

This paper evaluates artificial intelligence's (AI's) foray into financial markets and the resultant implications for theory and practice. I argue for reevaluating mainstream financial theories and proactively building governance frameworks. I also advocate for external audits and oversight that...

We study how high-frequency traders (HFTs) strategically decide their speed level in a market with a random speed bump. If HFTs recognize the market impact of their speed decision, they perceive a wider bid-ask spread as an endogenous upward-sloping cost of being faster. We find that the speed...

We study how high-frequency traders (HFTs) strategically decide their speed level in a market with a random speed bump. If HFTs recognize the market impact of their speed decision, they perceive a wider bid-ask spread as an endogenous upward-sloping cost of being faster. We find that the speed...

We study how high-frequency traders (HFTs) strategically decide their speed level in a market with a random speed bump. If HFTs recognize the market impact of their speed decision, they perceive a wider bid-ask spread as an endogenous upward-sloping cost of being faster. We find that the speed...

A speed bump in financial markets is an intentional delay imposed on trade execution. Its primary purpose is to mitigate asymmetric information by slowing down high-frequency traders (HFTs). In contrast to its intended purpose, this paper shows that a speed bump has the crowding-in effect on...

We study how high-frequency traders (HFTs) strategically decide their speed level in a market with a random speed bump. If HFTs recognize the market impact of their speed decision, they perceive a wider bid-ask spread as an endogenous upward-sloping cost of being faster. We find that the speed...