We develop a two-period general equilibrium model of portfolio delegation with competitive, differentially skilled managers and convex compensation contracts. We show that convex incentives lead to significant equilibrium mispricing, but reduce price volatility. In particular, price...

I study the impact of informed trading on voluntary corporate disclosure in the presence of two factors: the cost of disclosure and the value of a manager's informed‐ness. In the absence of both factors, informed trading has no impact on disclosure even when traders are not certain whether the...

Stock price often provides firms with new information, which can be used in the firms' subsequent real decisions. While prior studies focus on the ex-ante choice of disclosure in the presence of this feedback effect, we study how the feedback affects a myopic manager's incentive to bias the...

I study the impact of informed trading on voluntary corporate disclosure in the presence of two frictions: cost of disclosure and value of manager's informedness. In the absence of both frictions, informed trading has no impact on disclosure even when traders are not certain whether the manager...

Firms with correlated fundamentals often issue reports sequentially, leading to information spillovers. The theoretical literature has investigated multi-firm reporting, but only when firms report simultaneously. We examine the implications of sequential reporting, where firms aim to maximize...

Managers and investors frequently converse and exchange complementary private information. We develop a model to study the conversation dynamics between a myopic manager and a long-term investor. The opportunity of the investor to convey private information affects the manager's disclosure...