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Public school choice often yields student placements that are neither fair nor efficient. Kesten (2010) proposed an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm (EADAM) that allows students to consent to waive priorities that have no effect on their assignment. In this article, we provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013338750
Public school choice often yields student placements that are neither fair nor efficient. Kesten (2010) proposed an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm (EADAM) that allows students to consent to waive priorities that have no effect on their assignment. In this article, we provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012815570
This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop a procurement auction model where bidders can form bidding rings, and derive the bidding and collusive behavior under no sanction, debarment and fines. The model's predictions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985442
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012819866
This article presents the first experiment exploring the impact of debarments - the exclusion of colluding bidders - on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments and their most common alternative, fines, reduce collusion and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852366
This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop a procurement auction model where bidders can form bidding rings, and derive the bidding and collusive behavior under no sanction, debarment and fines. The model's predictions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822812
This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of applicants under two of the most commonly used school admissions procedures: the Gale-Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information about the mechanism,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012041733
This paper develops a strategic model of procrastination in which present-biased agents prefer to do an onerous task in the company of someone else. This turns their decision of when to do the task into a procrastination game { a dynamic coordination game between present-biased players. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490868
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003820411
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003896759