Who is tempted by versus resilient to investment premiums from ‘sin stocks’ that produce social harm? We present a correlational (N = 218) and experimental study (N = 646) to examine a) willingness to invest in sin stocks without a return premium, b) how temptation increases as premiums...

Wer der Ungewissheit angesichts der Pandemie mit übermäßigem Konsum von Informationen begegnet, strapaziert seine kognitive Kapazität über Gebühr.

Beyond the many choices and challenges humans face during the pandemic lies a constant cognitive trade-off: Those who excessively absorb news against uncertainty run the risk of impaired cognitive functions.

This paper tests whether staying ignorant about the negative consequences of one's own actions affects agents' performance in a real effort experiment. We conducted treatments in which subjects' effort either increased only one's own payoff or also increased the donation to a bad charity....

The extensive economics literature on lying has focused nearly exclusively on studying experimental settings where individuals can lie for financial rewards. However, in everyday interactions, lying to enhance one’s social- and self-image is ubiquitous and perhaps even more common than lying...

This paper studies lying. An agent randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then report any number and receive a monetary payoff based only on her report. The paper presents a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior. In an experiment, we find that the...

This paper studies lying in a simple framework. An agent first randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then claim to have observed any number from the set, receiving a monetary payoff based only on her report. Consistent with previous findings, our participants do not...

Milton Friedman has famously claimed that the responsibility of a manager who is not the owner of a firm is "to conduct the business in accordance with their [the shareholders'] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible." In this paper we argue that when contracts are...