We observe less efficient capital allocation in countries whose banking systems are more thoroughly controlled by tycoons or families. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of state control over banking. Unlike state control, tycoon or family control also correlates with slower...

We observe less efficient capital allocation in countries whose banking systems are more thoroughly controlled by tycoons or families. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of state control over banking. Unlike state control, tycoon or family control also correlates with slower...

Debt financing plays an important role in the funding of innovative firms, and patents have been increasingly used as collateral. We examine financing of innovative firms when future innovations are not verifiable and hence patenting, which creates a verifiable asset, cannot be contracted upon....

This paper examines the role of a related bank in the investment efficiency of business-group firms. We show that a bank is associated with less investment sensitivity to investment opportunities for family group firms, especially in financially dependent industries. There is evidence of...

Within countries, state-run banks' lending correlates with prior money growth; otherwise similar private-sector banks' lending does not. Aggregate credit and investment growth correlate with prior money growth more where banking systems are more state-run. Size and liquidity differences between...

We study investor networks in the stock market, through the lens of information network theory. We use a unique account level dataset of all trades on the Istanbul Stock Exchange in 2005, to identify traders who are similar in their trading behavior as linked in an empirical investor network...

This paper examines the role of a related bank in the investment efficiency of business-group firms. We show that a bank is associated with less investment sensitivity to investment opportunities for family group firms, especially in financially dependent industries. There is evidence of...