This paper investigates a novel public goods game where contributions to the public goods require effort that is observable. When the players are observed, they exert more effort to contribute to the public goods, and free-riding diminishes significantly compared to the no observer case. These...

We study the effects of available student loan repayment plans on borrowers' career choices. By removing the risk of loan default, income driven repayment (IDR) plans make higher-paying but riskier jobs more attractive to those with moderate skill levels. We present experimental evidence that...

We examine the role of cognitive ability, personality traits and gender in a one-shot gift exchange experiment. Controlling for cognitive ability and personality characteristics, men offer higher wages than women do, as do agents with greater cognitive ability and those scoring higher on...

In this paper, we provide a broad analysis of the performance of organ procurement organizations (OPOs) in the United States and investigate factors affecting the number and quality of procured organs. Using comprehensive data from 51 OPOs’ annual cost reports from 2015 to 2020, we find wide...

In this paper, we provide a broad analysis of the performance of organ procurement organizations (OPOs) in the United States and investigate factors affecting the number and quality of procured organs. Using comprehensive data from 51 OPOs’ annual cost reports from 2015 to 2020, we find wide...

We experimentally test alternative auction designs suitable for pricing and removing troubled assets from banks’ balance sheets as part of the financial rescue. Many individual securities or pools of securities are auctioned simultaneously. Securities that are widely held are purchased in...

We examine bidding behavior in a clock auction in which price is set by the lowest-accepted bid and provisional winners are reported each round (the LABpw auction). This format was used in the India 3G spectrum auction. In the standard theory, the auction performs poorly. In particular it yields...

We analyze the implications of different pricing rules in discrete clock auctions. The two most common pricing rules are highest-rejected bid (HRB) and lowest-accepted bid (LAB). Under HRB, the winners pay the lowest price that clears the market; under LAB, the winners pay the highest price that...