I study a college-admissions model with two need-blind colleges and heterogeneous students. In a game in which colleges can choose a financial aid policy and either binding, nonbinding, or no early admissions, a unique equilibrium outcome exists. In equilibrium—and consistent with data—the...

I study how a matching platform's design affects users' welfare and probability of matching (outcomes) and the strategic decisions behind such a design. I consider a two-sided matching model in which each agent has a limited number of prospects. An increase in agents' number of prospects has two...

I study a college-admissions model with two need-blind colleges and heterogeneous students. In a game in which colleges can choose a financial aid policy and either binding, nonbinding, or no early admissions, a unique equilibrium outcome exists. In equilibrium—and consistent with data—the...

I study the relationship between a matching platform's design and users' welfare. Increasing users' number of prospects has a positive choice effect (users are more likely to find a desirable partner) and a negative competition effect (users are less likely to match). The interaction of choice...

Can an information intermediary mitigate the harmful effect of persuasive communication? How does her success depend on her private information? We modify Kamenica and Gentzkow’s (2011) Bayesian persuasion framework to accommodate a privately-informed intermediary representing the receiver’s...