This study first investigates why only some banks use the internal models (IMs) introduced by Basel II that lead to more risk-sensitive capital ratios than standardized approaches (SA). I predict that banks opt for an IM if it allows economizing on capital requirements, given their underlying...

This study examines changes in market discipline in European corporate deposit markets in response to different crisis periods and regulatory initiatives in the European Union. We measure market discipline by investigating the risk sensitivity of uninsured corporate deposits, i.e. by analyzing...

This paper places the institution of bank deposit protection in the context of government paternalism. I apply the theories of deposit insurance, merit goods, patronized goods, government paternalism, and institutional change to the analysis of the Russian case. I rely on statistical data from...

In this paper, we use U.S. commercial banks' data to investigate whether the effect of unexpected deposit flows on loan production depends on banks' exposure to off-balance sheet funding liquidity risk. We find that lending is sensitive to deposit shocks at small banks but not at large ones....

We examine the role of private deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a financial crisis. We present novel evidence that banks headquartered in Massachusetts whose deposits are federally and privately insured obtain more deposits, expand lending, and originate...

We develop a novel approach to study how banks respond to fluctuations in the risk of panic-driven retail deposit withdrawals. To proxy for changes in withdrawal risk, we track online information acquisition about different brands of UK banks. We find that banks facing surges in information...

In early 2009 the EU increased the minimum deposit insurance limit from €20,000 to €100,000 per bank account. Italy was the only country with a limit already set to €103,291 from 1994. To evaluate the impact of the new directive we run a diff-in-diff analysis and compare the bank-size...

We assess the effect of formal enforcement actions against banks for safety and soundness reasons on punished banks' deposits, and then examine whether this effect is caused by demand-side or supply-side forces. To this end, we use hand-collected data on enforcement actions, and bank-quarter...

We study retail deposit withdrawals from commercial banks which were differentially exposed to distress during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. We show that the propensity of households to withdraw deposits increases with the severity of bank distress. Withdrawal risk is, however, substantially...

We employ proprietary data from a large bank to analyze how – in times of crisis – depositors react to a bank nationalization, re-privatization and an accompanying increase in deposit insurance. Nationalization slows depositors fleeing the bank, provided they have sufficient trust in the...