Two–way communication via social media platforms allows the firm to make an initial disclosure decision and then revise it after observing the response on social media to its initial decision. We examine the pressures interactive communications place on disclosure choices and find that...

This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the...

Using a dataset of 3,234 letters sent by 434 hedge funds to their investors during 1995-2011, we study what motivates hedge fund managers to make voluntary disclosures. Contrary to the hedge fund industry's reputation for opacity, we observe that managers provide their investors with an array of...

Encouraging organizations to be more open has been a key issue in contemporary debates over nonprofit accountability. However, our understanding of what motivates organizations to the disclosure decision is weak. We aim to enhance our understanding of this critical issue by developing and...

We examine a voluntary disclosure that is nonproprietary in nature and simply reflects management's intention to explain how a widely-known nonrecurring economic event is reported in financial statements. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA) retroactively reinstated previously expired...

This paper presents a model of voluntary disclosure in which the manager's information about the firm's value is granular, i.e., consists of a large random number of imprecise signals. Using an argument in the spirit of the Bernstein-von Mises theorem, we show that there exists a simple...

Public information that becomes available after a manager’s initial voluntary disclosure decision creates incentives for her to reconsider and possibly change that decision. We show that if she has private information that is value relevant or that impacts the firms ability to compete in its...

The literature on voluntary disclosure in oligopolies concentrates either on Cournot markets where firms compete in quantities or on Bertrand markets where firms compete in prices. In this paper we study voluntary disclosure of managerial contract information in a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly where...

This research aims to identify voluntary disclosure indices and components as well as the impact of corporate governance system on information asymmetry. This research is archival survey. In terms of survey research dimension, the statistic population, the accounting and finance’s experts’...