In this paper, we analyze the consequences of taking noise into account in a simple two person fishery management game. Both a stochastic and deterministic formulation are considered. Compared to the noise-free model it is shown that the used stochastic framework has no implications for the...

In this note, we reconsider the indefinite open-loop Nash linear quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon. In particular, we derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which the game will have a unique equilibrium

In this note, we consider the open-loop Nash linear quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite and the underlying system affine. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has a unique Nash...

We study non-linear Markov perfect equilibria in a two agent linear quadratic differential game. In contrast to the literature owing to Tsutsui and Mino (1990), we do not associate endogenous subsets of the state space with candidate solutions. Instead, we address the problem of unbounded-below...

In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon for descriptor systems of index one. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has...

In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite and the underlying system affine. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has a...

This paper introduces the notion of mixed leadership in non-zero-sum differential games, where there is no fixed hierarchy in decision making with respect to the players. Whether a particular player is leader or follower depends on the instrument variable s/he is controlling, and it is possible...

We study a dynamic Stackelberg differential game between a buyer and a seller of insurance policies in a spectrally negative Lévy framework, in which both parties are ambiguous about the intensity and severity of insurable losses. Both the buyer and seller aim to maximize their expected wealth,...

Are the serves of the world’s best tennis pros consistent with the theoretical predictions of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies? We analyze their serve direction choices (to the receiver’s left, right or body) with data from an online database called the Match Charting Project. Using a...

We study a continuous-time problem of optimal public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent can allocate his wealth between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock of some public good. We study...