participation, the auction price tends to be lower. This is caused by an increase in the competitiveness of the auctions; detailed …

include non-price attributes, such as the switching costs. The buyer can run a scoring auction, in which suppliers compete on … the adjusted bids or scores, or, he can run a buyer-determined auction, in which suppliers compete on the price, and the … buyer adjusts a certain number of the bids with the non-price attributes after the auction to determine the winner. Unless …

We study the effect on cost overruns of auction formats (average bid as opposed to first price rule) conditional on the … auctions relative to first price auctions. We find support to this belief only when participation to the auction is restricted …

Drawing on the real-options theory we analyse bidding behaviour in a sealed-bid-first-score procurement auction where …

auction. In our model, firms are invited into the auction at positive costs, and a bureaucrat runs the auction on behalf of a … bureaucrat will invite more than socially optimal number of firms into the auction. Secondly, the effects of corruption on … spending. In the case of proportional bribe, the bureaucrat may invite fewer or more firms into the auction, depending on how …

This paper contrasts two auction formats often used in public procurement: first price auctions with ex-post screening … analysis reveals that their ranking is ambiguous in terms of revenues, but the average bid auction is typically less efficient …