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Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? : an experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game

Zylbersztejn, Adam - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361827

All but one free ride when wealth effects are small

Silvestre, Joaquim - In: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 201-207

Quasilinear preferences on a public good and a numeraire good are limits of preferences where both goods are normal. The set of equilibria of the voluntary contribution (or private provision) game is easily characterized under quasilinearity by: top valuators aggregately contribute their common...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317090

All it takes is one : the effect of weakest-link and summation aggregation on public good provision under threshold uncertainty

Carlsson, Frederik; Ek, Claes; Lange, Andreas - 2021

We report experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods under threshold uncertainty. By explicitly comparing two prominent technologies, summation and weakest link, we show that uncertainty is particularly detrimental to threshold attainment under weakest link, where low...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012696938

Constrained public goods in networks

Allouch, Nizar; King, Maia - 2018

This paper analyses the private provision of public goods where agents interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbours' provisions. We survey the literature and then generalise the public goods in networks model of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856863

Voting for burden sharing rules in public goods games

Gallier, Carlo; Kesternich, Martin; Sturm, Bodo - 2014

In this experiment, we endogenize the choice of which contribution scheme is implemented in a public goods game. We investigate three rule-based contribution schemes. In a first step, players agree on a common group provision level using the principle of the smallest common denominator....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405384

Zur Manipulierbarkeit der Allokation öffentlicher Güter : theoretische Analyse und Simulationsergebnisse

Lindner, Tobias - 2011

Vorschlägen eine Budgetaufteilung (Allokation) bestimmt wird. Von besonderem Interesse ist die Frage, welche Abstimmungsregeln … nicht manipulierbar sind, das heißt für keinen Agenten einen Anreiz bieten, eine Allokation vorzuschlagen, die nicht mit … diese Verfahren als auch andere Abstimmungsregeln zur Allokation öffentlicher Güter sind, wenn man die weitaus größere …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012654078

Efficient public good provision in networks : revisiting the Lindahl solution

Jain, Anil - 2017

The provision of public goods in developing countries is a central challenge. This paper studies a model where each agent's effort provides heterogeneous benefits to the others, inducing a network of opportunities for favor-trading. We focus on a classical efficient benchmark – the Lindahl...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011709786

Chapter 49 Public Action for Public Goods

Banerjee, Abhijit; Iyer, Lakshmi; Somanathan, Rohini - In: Handbook of development economics : volume 4, (pp. 3117-3154). 2007

This paper focuses on the relationship between public action and access to public goods. It begins by developing a simple model to capture the various mechanisms that are discussed in the theoretical literature on collective action. We use the model to illustrate the special assumptions embedded...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024671

Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma - 2009 - Rev.

This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003819988

Characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents

Morimoto, Shuhei; Serizawa, Shigehiro; Ching, Stephen - 2010

We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003929953