Per capita carbon emissions are an important concept in international negotiations of climate policies and also in future projections of aggregate carbon emissions. This paper argues that the convergence studies on per capita carbon emissions in the literature are theoretically biased because...

A two-tier climate club exploits the comparative advantage of large countries to mete out punishments through trade, while taking their capacity to resist punishment as a constraint. Countries outside the coalition price carbon at a fixed fraction of the average carbon price adopted within the...

International carbon markets are frequently propagated as an efficient instrument for reducing CO2 emissions. We argue that such markets, despite their desirable efficiency properties, might not be in the best interest of governments who are guided by strategic considerations in negotiations. We...

International carbon markets are frequently propagated as an efficient instrument for reducing CO2 emissions. We argue that such markets, despite their desirable efficiency properties, might not be in the best interest of governments who are guided by strategic considerations in negotiations. We...

International carbon markets are frequently propagated as an efficient instrument for reducing CO2 emissions. We argue that such markets, despite their desirable efficiency properties, might not be in the best interest of governments who are guided by strategic considerations in negotiations. We...

In this paper, we study the incentives for international cooperation if (some) countries prefer a more equitable distribution of per capita emission levels. For countries that differ with respect to their population size, we analyze the impact of such an equity preference first for a bilateral,...

CO2 emissions from international shipping, which are currently unregulated, are predicted to rise from 2.7% today to 18% in 2050. International bunker fuel emissions have been excluded from any commitment in the Kyoto Protocol; the UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen also failed to bring about clear...

We describe three essential elements of an effective post-2012 international global climate policy architecture: a means to ensure that key industrialized and developing nations are involved in differentiated but meaningful ways; an emphasis on an extended time path of targets; and inclusion of...

Our purpose is to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of a Partial Climate Agreement with open entry under a non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium framework. We evaluate a partial agreement policy in which non-signatory countries can decide to join or to leave a coalition of the willing at any...