We estimate the wage penalty associated with working in the South African informal sector.To this end we use a rich data set on non-self employed males that allows one to accuratelydistinguish workers employed in the informal sector from those employed in the formal sectorand link individuals...

We show theoretically that when larger firms pay higher wages and are more likely to becaught defaulting on labour taxes, then large high-wage firms will be in the formal sector andsmall low-wage firms will be in the informal sector...

We model a standard competitve labour market where firms choose combinations of workers and hours per worker to produce output. If one assumes that the scale of production has no impact on hours per worker, then the change in the number of workers and hours per worker resulting from a minimum...

We show theoretically that when larger firms pay higher wages and are more likely to be caught defaulting on labour taxes, then large high-wage firms will be in the formal sector and small low-wage firms will be in the informal sector. The formal sector wage premium is thus just a firm size wage...

We develop a model where formal sector firms pay tax and informal ones do not, but informal firms risk incurring the penalty associated with non-compliance. Workers may enter self-employment or search for jobs as employees. Workers with higher managerial skills will run larger firms while...