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-assessments can be detrimental to workers' performance. In the controlled environment of a laboratory gift-exchange experiment, our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467800
We use economic experiments to examine the nature of relational trading under a menu of incomplete contracts ranging from the repeat purchase mechanism of Klein and Leffler (1981) to highly incomplete contracts that are completely unenforceable by third-parties. Our results suggest that, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003609846
We develop a model of strategic contractual incompleteness that identifies conditions under which principals might omit even costlessly verifiable terms. We then use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of the model. While it is well known that verifiability imperfections can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457849
We study a relational contracting model with two agents where each agent faces multiple tasks: effort toward the agent's own project and helping effort toward another agent's project. We first propose the two-step approach, which is useful for characterizing the equilibrium of relational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013007681
We consider relational contracts for teams in which the agents monitor each other. We demonstrate that providing rents to the agents strengthens peer sanction endowed within the agents' ongoing relationship, which may have a negative effect to induce unproductive collusion as well as a positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863568
We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms — which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856582
We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration -...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012318860
We use economic experiments to examine the nature of relational trading under a menu of incomplete contracts ranging from the repeat purchase mechanism of Klein and Leffler (1981) to highly incomplete contracts that are completely unenforceable by third-parties. Our results suggest that, with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762063
maximization problem of the firm. As a result, monitoring and pay should be complements. In our experiment, between and within …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349705
We implement a laboratory experiment in which a principal has to decide on monitoring intensity and pay to investigate … be complements. The between-treatment variation in our experiment is qualitatively in line with the normative prediction …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489889