Using manager compensation disclosure and intra-family manager cooperation measures, we create indices of family-level competitive/cooperative incentives. Families that encourage cooperation among their managers are more likely to engage in coordinated behavior (e.g., cross-trading,...

Typical contracts assign both coercive and non-coercive means of power to the principal's side, providing the agent with a comparably small range of countervailing anti-power. Initially agents are therefore vulnerable to opportunistic principal behavior and will rationally anticipate this threat...

We examine team diversity and performance using the asset management industry as a laboratory. Employing political affiliation as a proxy, we find ideologically diverse teams perform better than homogeneous teams. The mechanism involves both improved decision-making due to more diverse...

Many investors purchase open-end mutual funds through intermediaries, paying brokers and financial advisors for fund distribution and advice via alternative sale charge fee structures. We argue that the fee structure choice reveals valuable information about investors horizon. That allows...

Early research work theorized franchising to exist because Hybridal Form Benefits (HFB) are achieved by the franchisor. Compared to the full hierarchy, franchising was held to reduce agency costs, to overcome resource scarcity and to enable risk sharing. Lately, the focus has shifted to an...

This work explores the strategic motivation of franchisors to combine franchised and company-owned stores when structuring their distribution networks. In the United States, such plurally organized chains have already outnumbered purely franchised competitors.Based on a review of existing...

In this paper, we examine ownership structures of franchise chains and evaluate their impact on franchisor profit. Specifically we compare pure forms of franchising with those that use both company-owned and franchised outlets within one chain - a phenomenon termed the plural form. Theoretically...

Typical contracts assign both coercive and non-coercive means of power to the principal's side, providing the agent with a comparably small range of countervailing anti-power. Initially agents are therefore vulnerable to opportunistic principal behavior and will rationally anticipate this threat...

We examine how firms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions using plant-level data. We find that there is extensive restructuring in a short period following mergers and full-firm acquisitions. Acquirers of full firms sell 27% and close 19% of the plants of target firms within three years of...

Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an...