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Reelection threshold contracts in politics

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408440

Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2004

We consider a model with a politician facing a multi-task problem while in office. The reelection mechanism distorts the allocation of effort in favor of tasks whose outcomes can be measured more precisely than others. We show that a hierarchy of elections and incentive contracts can alleviate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014145815

Incentive Contracts for Politicians and the Down-Up Problem

Gersbach, Hans - 2000

macroeconomic developments. Finally, we comment on practical issues when such contracts are used in election races …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014188188

Incentive contracts for politicians and the information efficiency of a democracy

Liessem, Verena - 2003

A campaign model in which candidates can make law announcements for reforms in the next term will be considered. Acquiring information about these laws incurs the candidates a certain cost. The conditions under which a candidate acquires information about a given law during the campaign will be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075256

Incentive contracts for politicians : a viable supplement to democracies?

Liessem, Verena - 2003

When reelection is uncertain, the election mechanism may provide insufficient incentives to politicians to implement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075458

Populism

Frisell, Lars - 2004

In their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but just try to outguess popular opinion. Although rational voters see through such populism, candidates can not resist resorting to it when the spoils of office are too large. For an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584560

Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts and Elections

Gersbach, Hans - 2021

When politicians are short-term oriented or future elections do not sufficiently reflect the success of past policies, democratic elections cannot motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321142

Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections

Gersbach, Hans - 2001

When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397764

Government Contracting and the Threat of Re-Election

Seamans, Robert - 2015

Incumbent politicians may worry about their chances of re-election. Re-election concerns may induce incumbents to write …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027559

Information on the ballot, voter satisfaction and election turnout

Sajons, Christoph - 2016

unknown and party-identification cannot be used to distinguish them. This case often appears in election systems with either … experimental exit-poll of voters at local elections in two German states in 2014 in which respondents faced a hypothetical election … translates directly into a greater willingness to take part in the hypothetical election (“turnout”), especially for individuals …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011483220

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