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This paper uses a new database on campaign funding on French members of parliament to analyze their efficiency. The database includes the level of funding, as well as the origin of the resources the politicians have at their disposal. The funding sources are identified with true resources used...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013140277
We construct an election game to study the electoral impacts of biased candidate endorsements. We derive a set of … testable predictions. We test these in a laboratory experiment and find that observed election outcomes and vote shares are … well predicted. We find no support, however, for our prediction that the relationship between election outcome and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841512
voters' preferences for the outcome of the election. Specifically, we show that candidates benefit from increased voter … attention under all rules other than negative plurality. Second, less attentive voters have a larger impact on the election …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869460
What explains the wide variation across countries in the use of vote buying and policy promises during election … targeted with vote buying pre-election may receive no government benefits post-election. The results point to obstacles to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012970278
We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome distribution and donation flows in a legislature feature a discontinuity at the approval threshold of bills if special interest groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861433
We consider a canonical two-period model of elections with adverse selection (hidden preferences) and moral hazard (hidden actions), in which neither voters nor politicians can commit to future choices. We prove existence of electoral equilibria, and we show that office holders mix between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013022706
To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy passes or paid up front. With transfer promises, a vote costs nearly zero....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013222525