We introduce democratic mechanisms where individual utilities are not observable by other people at the legislative stage. We show that the combination of three rules can yield e±cient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules where the size of the majority depends...

We examine financial intermediation when banks can offer deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We show that the risk allocation is efficient if there is no workout of banking crises. In this case, banks will shift part of the risk to depositors. In contrast, under a...

In this paper we examine how individuals should be treated with respect to taxes, subsidies and agenda setting in constitutions in order to obtain efficient allocations of public goods and to limit tax distortions. We show that if public goods are socially desirable, the simple majority rule as...

Demokratische Entscheidungsprozesse werden zurzeit vielfach angegriffen. Insbesondere in der Digitalisierung sehen viele eine Gefahr für die Demokratie. Der Autor sieht hingegen Chancen für die Demokratie und plädiert dafür, digitale Instrumente auszuprobieren. Digitale Instrumente wie...