This study examines how leader selection is affected by individual qualifications and willingness to lead using laboratory experiments. The experimental treatments are whether the candidate’s information involves the willingness to lead (WTL), and whether the group leader’s task emphasizes...

Two sellers with differentiated products compete and coordinate in a market by setting price frames first in Stage 1 and price levels later in Stage 2. A consumer's purchase decision depends not only on the difference of the net values, but also on the difference of the price frames. An increase...

We study a class of multi-stage imperfectly discriminatory team contests with Blotto budgets and complete information. We fully characterize the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this class of contests under certain basic assumptions, and show that in the two-stage case, there will be a unique...

This study examines how leader selection is affected by individual qualifications and willingness to lead using laboratory experiments. The experimental treatments are whether the candidate’s information involves the willingness to lead (WTL), and whether the group leader’s task emphasizes...

We propose a simple commitment mechanism prior to a public goods contribution game. Each player simultaneously and independently proposes a deduction rate, which serves as a proposal for the rate by which the return on private investment accounts will be reduced. The group deduction rate is...

Although contests are recognized theoretically as a highly effective method of motivation, the competitive nature of contests may generate unintended negative effects on social interactions in more general settings beyond contests. Using a laboratory experiment of real effort tasks with...