-discriminate among potential buyers. To understand why this is the case, we consider an auction-like environment in which a seller with … trading process resembles the Dutch auction, except that the seller is allowed to offer different prices to different buyers … payoff is driven down to the second-price auction level. Our analysis suggests that having the discretion to price …

countries of origin. We employ the Vickrey second-price sealed bid auction and conducted auctions in three major cities in …

This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap …' of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction without handicaps. The paper also discusses the allocation rule …

companies with higher abilities can make more profits by licenses and are willing to pay higher prices for them. Thus, auction …

-unit simultaneous ascending auction. The global bidder wants to win both licenses to enjoy synergies; therefore, she bids more than her … the frequency of inefficient allocation in the simultaneous ascending auction. Then, we show that the Vickrey …-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism may generate more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction. …

) characterization of the Vickrey combinatorial auction as the unique efficient, strategy-proof, and individually rational allocation …

that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result explains the pervasive use of the SA auction. …

Potential bidders respond to a seller's choice of auction mechanism for a common-value or affiliated-values asset by …. Privately informed participants decide whether to incur a bid-preparation cost and pay an entry fee, or cease competing. Auction … revenue identity for any auction mechanism implies that optimal auctions are allocatively efficient; a nontrivial reserve …

price 1. Good y can be obtained in an auction. In such a situation we show that bidding ones own valuation is an equilibrium … in a second-price auction. With risk neutral bidders and high enough incomes we derive the symmetric equilibrium in first … restrictions, the revenue maximising reserve price is zero for all the three auctions and the all-pay auction with zero reserve …