We study the government's decision to sell a state-owned enterprise to strategic investors in a common value auction … setting. The government can choose to sell his control stake all at once, or to design a sequential auction of shares. The … sequential auction allows information transmission, so that the winner of the first stake receives a signal about the value of …

the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart … in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We show however that certain retaliatory equilibria do exist in both …

that never yield an efficient allocation. Moreover, our results extend the efficiency of auction mechanisms to an …

We consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private … bid as much as the other bidder to win the auction. Analogously, the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as … overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction. Clearly, this has important implications on equilibrium behavior. We …

This article reports the results of a first-price sealed-bid auction experiment, which has been designed to test the … data provide evidence that this overbidding regularity can be a consequence of the standard information feedback in auction … experiments of revealing only the winning bid after each auction. By means of learning direction theory we explain the individual …

Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own …

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction …