We describe the fundamental groups of ordered and unordered k-point sets in Cn generating an affine subspace of fixed dimension.

A toric arrangement is a finite set of hypersurfaces in a complex torus, every hypersurface being the kernel of a character. In the present paper we prove that if TW is the toric arrangement defined by the cocharacters lattice of a Weyl group W, then the integer cohomology of its complement is...

The paper presents a new framework to assess firm level heterogeneity and to study the rate and direction of technical change. Building on the analysis of revealed short-run production functions by Hildenbrand (1981), we propose the (normalized) volume of the zonotope composed by vectors-firms...

The "doctrinal paradox", also called "discursive dilemma", shows that the aggregation of judgements held by different individuals is problematic and can lead to group-level inconsistencies, although each individual is consistent. This aggregation problem has intuitive similarities with the...

A toric arrangement is a finite set of hypersurfaces in a complex torus, every hypersurface being the kernel of a character. In the present paper we build a CW-complex S homotopy equivalent to the arrangement complement Rx, with a combinatorial description similar to that of the well-known...

Marengo and the second author have developed in the last years a geometric model of social choice when this takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, showing that by bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority has the power of determining the social...

We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of...

In [MP08] L. Marengo and C. Pasquali present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained. In this paper we extend and generalize this approach by providing a geometric model of...

We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of...