Tax deduction of charitable donations is treasury efficient if it generates at least as much in additional donations as the government forgoes in revenue. Yet, the vital measure is the value of the public goods that donations produce. Thus, we reevaluate the efficiency of the tax deduction.Our...

We consider an economy in which some taxpayers behave in a Kantian way in their donation behavior while others are Nash players. A Kantian taxpayer holds the norm that any suggested deviation from a proposed equilibrium profile would be adopted by him only if when all members of their community...

This paper characterizes efficient tax subsidies for charitable contributions, and considers the properties of potential reforms. Contributions are underprovided in the absence of subsidies, and are misdirected if subsidies fail to account for all of the costs that donors incur. It is costly for...

This article explores a long-standing research and policy question on whether tax incentives for charitable giving are desirable from legal and economic perspectives. The author discusses legal and empirical aspects that are important in designing tax incentives for charitable giving. Firstly,...

This paper examines how the tax simulation method can be extended to incorporate nonlinear budget constraints and nonstandard economic behavior. We simulate the effect of extending the charitable deduction to nonitemizers and study the effect of alternative "floors". The specific simulations...

The exogenous manipulation of choice architectures to achieve social ends ('social nudges') can raise problems of effectiveness and ethicality because it favors group outcomes over individual outcomes. One answer is to give individuals control over their nudge ('self-nudge'), but the trade-offs...

In this paper, we investigate the joint influence of empirical and normative expectations on cooperative behavior. We conduct two experimental studies (n = 243) in which we separately elicit (i) behavior in a public goods game and (ii) social norms under the form of normative and empirical...