In recent years, we have been interested in the up-and-down prospects of academic societies, including both universities and academies. We have developed a University-Academy Coupling Model, which is built on the multi-agent simulation technique. In the artificial society, there exist both...

An improved cellular automaton model for pedestrian dynamics was established, where both static floor field and collision effect derived from game theory were considered. Several model parameters were carefully determined by previous studies. Results obtained through model-based simulation and...

Following Yamauchi’s study [A. Yamauchi, J. Tanimoto, A. Hagishima, H. Sagara, Dilemma game structure observed in traffic flow at a 2-to-1 lane junction, Physical Review E 79 (2009) 036104], we find that several social dilemma structures are represented by n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (n-PD)...

A 2×2 game model implemented by co-evolution of both networks and strategies is established. An existing link between two agents is killed through network adaptation, which then establishes a new link to replace it. Strategy is defined as an offer of “cooperation” (C) or “defection” (D)...

A series of numerical experiments on 2×2 games using a co-evolutionary model, including both networks and strategies, was performed. A relationship between assortativity by degree of the evolved network and emerging cooperation was investigated. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game class, the...

Perc & Wang demonstrated that aspiring to be the fittest under conditions of pairwise strategy updating enhances network reciprocity in structured populations playing 2×2 Prisoner’s Dilemma games (Z. Wang, M. Perc, Aspiring to the fittest and promoted of cooperation in the Prisoner’s...

Masuda [N. Masuda, Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation, Proceedings of the Royal Society B 274 (2007) 1815–1821] reported that a game participation cost (expressed by adding same negative values to all four elements in a 2 × 2...