Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop a theory of optimal incentive contracting where the monitoring technology that governs the above procedure is part of the...

Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop a theory of optimal incentive contracting where the monitoring technology that governs the above procedure is part of the...

Recent advances in IT and data science give firms more flexibility to process, store and communicate the growing volume and variety of performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. In this paper, we study the impact of this cost and flexibility on employee monitoring and the internal...

I examine an agency model where the principal has either a legitimate or an illegitimate motive for revising the incentive contract, whereas the agent does not observe the principal's motive and creates more organizational frictions as he becomes more suspicious that the principal is...

In this paper I examine a T-period agency model with imperfect public monitoring between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent where signals can depend on the agent's past actions and exhibit serial correlation. In this general environment, I show that near-efficiency obtains when T...

I examine incentive contracting with an agent who disagrees with the principal and creates organizational frictions when the actual performance evaluation and compensation fall short of what he thinks he should earn. Results show that seemingly rigid policies, such as long-term performance...