This paper studies collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, called endogenous bid-rotation, which gives a payoff larger than the bid-rotation payoff, when valuations are...

In a set-target game, two players choose elements in some set X, and payoffs depend on whether the value of some function of these choices lies in a target set T. Typically, a set-target game has a continuum of Nash equilibria. Replacing the deterministic set T by a stochastic one and then...

Appellate courts sometimes issue inconsistent decisions. Individual judges are sometimes inconsistent too. We argue that making judges more consistent could exacerbate the problem of inconsistent courts. We do so through a variant of Arrow's model of preference aggregation in which preferences...

There are settings in which linear prices are negotiated by procurement agents and final consumption decision made by end users who are indifferent to negotiated prices.For example, a patient seeking medical treatment is indifferent to the treatment's cost, if it is covered by his insurance...

We clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of Rachmilevitch (2013). Rachmilevitch (2013), henceforth R13, studies the following game. Two ex ante identical players are about to participate in an independent-private-value first-price, sealed bid auction...