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Institutional design and antitrust evidentiary standards
Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea; Tropeano, Jean-Philippe - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011300959
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Measuring benchmark damages in antitrust litigation
McCrary, Justin; Rubinfeld, Daniel L. - In: Journal of econometric methods 3 (2014) 1, pp. 63-74
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010242081
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Corporate criminals in a market context : enforcement and optimal sanctions
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Hjelmeng, Erling; Søreide, Tina - In: European journal of law and economics 56 (2023) 2, pp. 225-287
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014420480
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Corporate criminals in a market context : enforcement and optimal sanctions
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Hjelmeng, Erling; Søreide, Tina - 2023
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014286698
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The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion
Emons, Winand - In: International journal of industrial organization 70 (2020), pp. 1-9
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012586710
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Learning by litigating : an application to antitrust commitments
Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea; Tropeano, Jean-Philippe - In: International journal of industrial organization 80 (2022), pp. 1-14
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013206706
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Learning by litigating : an application to antitrust commitments
Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea; Tropeano, Jean-Philippe - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012793740
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The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion
Emons, Winand - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012003835
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Optimal leniency programs when firms have cumulative and asymmetric evidence
Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - In: Review of industrial organization : RIO 52 (2018) 3, pp. 403-427
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012007968
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The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion
Emons, Winand - 2018 - Version: October 2018
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an … deterrence. Increasing the probability of an investigation at high levels reduces collusion, yet never completely. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011919342