"A growing number of field and experimental studies focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring,...

Improving rural credit markets requires a good understanding of the root causes of market failures and taking necessary steps to address them. This paper investigates the role of productivity shocks in borrowers repayment choices. Using a framed field experiment that simulated a repeated...

Many resource allocation contests have the property that individuals undertake costly actions to appropriate a potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality. The...

Many resource allocation contests have the property that individuals undertake costly actions to appropriate a potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality. The...

Building on existing work evaluating food-attribute labels, we use data collected in 2010 from a national web-based survey of 1,002 households to examine consumer inferences and valuations of food products promoted as “sustainably produced.†A best-worst scale framework was implemented...

Many resource allocation contests have the property that individuals undertake costly actions to appropriate a potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals’ decisions across three resource allocation contests which are isomorphic under riskneutrality. The...

Conventional wisdom as well as economic theory suggests it is more costly to reassemble fragmented land due to transactions costs and strategic bargaining costs. Both costs are expected to increase with the number of sellers. Inefficient allocation of land resources may result including property...

When an economic exchange requires agreement by multiple independent parties, the potential exists for an individual to strategically delay agreement in an attempt to capture a greater share of the surplus created by the exchange. This ‘‘holdout problem’’ is a common feature of the...