We study repeated Bayesian n-player games in which the players' privately known types evolve according an irreducible Markov chain. Our main result shows that, with communication, any Pareto-efficient payoff vector above a stationary minmax value can be approximated arbitrarily closely in a...

I extend Myersonʼs [R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73] ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the monotonicity constraint implied by...

In a differential information economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically non-empty. How ever, we exhibit a well-behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if...