Social Choice traditionally employs the preferences of voters or agents as primitives. However, in most situations of constitutional decision-making the beliefs of the members of the electorate determine their secondary preferences or choices. Key choices in US political history, such as the...

This paper investigates infrastructure investment in markets where regulation is subject to varying degrees of manipulation by elected politicians. Based on a model of price regulation in a market with increasing demand and long-term returns on investment we construct a multi-period game between...

Chapter 1. AI, Artificial Incompetence – The Ubiquitous Use of Binary Voting -- Chapter 2. Oh Lord, Give Me Consensus, but not Yet – Pluralism is Possible -- Chapter 3. The Art and Science of Compromise -- Chapter 4. The GOAT is a GNU – Electing an All-party Power-sharing Executive --...

Democratic institutions aggregate preferences poorly. The norm of one-person-one-vote with majority rule treats people fairly by giving everyone an equal chance to influence outcomes, but fails to give proportional weight to people whose interests in a social outcome are stronger than those of...