The authors empirically test Prendergast’s (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to explain the lack of consistent empirical support for a tradeoff between risk and incentives. Using data from the 1998 British WERS, the authors...

I estimate a structural model of teams, autonomy, and financial performance, using a cross section of British establishments. My findings suggest that team production improves financial performance for the typical establishment but that autonomous teams do no better than closely supervised or...

Using data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) employer survey, we document a new empirical finding that workers are less likely to receive promotions in nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms. Among other results, we also show that: wage increases associated with...

We test for the existence of gender bias in power relationships. Specifically, we examine whether police officers are less likely to issue traffic tickets to men or to women during traffic stops. Whereas the conventional wisdom, which we document with surveys, is that women are less likely to...

We provide a theoretical analysis of promotion tournaments in which workers 'strategically shirk' by purposely under-performing on tasks that are de-emphasized in a promotion rule, while over-performing in tasks that are emphasized in the rule, thereby increasing their chances of promotion and a...

We provide a new theory to explain why firms multitask workers rather than specializing them. Workers over-perform in tasks they like and under-perform in tasks they dislike, to favorably influence future job assignments. Anticipating this, firms may find it optimal to commit to future...