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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011033542
Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930793
We investigate the problem of reordering agents starting from an existing queue. First, we introduce four important axioms of the problem, budget balance (BB), outcome efficiency (OE), strategyproofness (SP), and individual rationality (IR). Unfortunately, it is easy to show that these four...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681413
We investigate the implications of egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler [22]) together with queue efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of queueing problems. We completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though there is no mechanism in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681414
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008925281
Subgroup additivity requires that a rule assigns the same expected ‘relative’ utility to each agent whether an agent’s expected relative utility is calculated from the problem involving all agents or from its sub-problems with a smaller number of agents. In this paper, we investigate its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776942
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'Journal of Economic Theory', 2014, 153, 33-45.<P> Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257404
The fixed-route traveling salesman problem with appointments, simply the appointment problem, is concerned with the following situation. Starting from home, a traveller makes a scheduled visit to a set of sponsors and returns home. If a sponsor in the route cancels her appointment, the traveller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011245946
We investigate the implications of welfare lower bounds together with queue-efficiency and strategyproofness in the context of the queueing problem. As a consequence, we provide alternative characterizations of the k-pivotal mechanisms (Mitra and Mutuswami [13]). First, we introduce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011245948
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005964190