We introduce a theoretical model of the active fund management industry (AFMI) in which performance and size depend on the AFMI's competitiveness (concentration). Under plausible assumptions, as AFMI's concentration decreases, so do fund managers' incentives for exerting effort in search of...

We introduce an international active fund management model in which competing managers have heterogeneous incentives (effort productivities, costs) for searching domestic/foreign investment opportunities. In equilibrium, the domestic/foreign incentives heterogeneity gives rise to a novel...

. We introduce continuous-time learning models of dynamic unobservable fund manager abilities under a nonlinear framework, with risk-neutral or risk-averse investors. In equilibrium, sensitivities of inferred manager abilities to fund returns’ innovation shocks are time nonmonotonic, inducing...

I introduce a model where fund family advisors optimize family values by secretly transferring performances among affiliated funds (cross-fund subsidization). Funds’ performances depend on unobservable manager abilities and cross-fund subsidization. By cross-fund subsidization, advisors...