This paper shows that long-term shareholders embed horizon incentives in executive compensation contracts as a mechanism to promote long-term oriented managerial behavior. Increases in long-term institutional ownership lead to longer equity vesting periods measured by CEO pay duration. Further,...

We find that the directorial labor market's ability to align the incentives of managers and shareholders depends on the aggregate level of investor protection in a country. If a country's corporate governance environment is strong and boards are likely to protect the interest of shareholders, a...

We find that the strength of countries' legal institutions can explain the ability of private firms to identify and terminate poorly performing managers. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that governance problems in private firms are ameliorated by strong institutions that reduce...

This study investigates the role of foreign institutional investors (FIIs) in restraining earnings management activities of firms under varying levels of investor protection. Firms manage their earnings less when independent FIIs are among their shareholders, especially when monitoring is more...

We use CEO health shocks as a time-varying and physical managerial attribute that can change the degree of managerial effort. Using hand-collected data on CEO illnesses, deaths, and medical leaves to identify large health shocks, we find that firm value is considerably lower and firm volatility,...

Upon the revelation of corporate misconduct by firms in their portfolios, institutional investors experience a significant discount in the market value of their portfolios, creating a negative externality that averages $92.7 billion of losses per year. This negative spillover increases with...

We study the economic consequences of a recent securities regulation that grants U.S. regulators broad new powers to revise or reject foreign acquisitions of firms deemed critical to U.S. national security. Our results document an important tradeoff between U.S. national security and shareholder...

This paper examines the impact of currency derivatives on firm value using a broad sample of firms from thirty-nine countries with significant exchange-rate exposure. Derivatives can be used for managers' self-interest, for hedging or for speculative purposes. We hypothesize that investors can...

This paper examines the impact of the strength of governance on firms' use of currency derivatives. Using a sample of firms from 30 countries over the period 1990 to 1999, we find that strongly governed firms tend to use derivatives to hedge currency exposure and overcome costly external...

This paper examines investment strategies of Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), their effect on target firm valuation, and how both of these are related to SWF transparency. We find that SWFs prefer large and poorly performing firms facing financial difficulties. Their investments have a positive...