Drawing on a single large U.S. corporation's personnel records for the years 1989-93, the authors analyze an example of the kind of formal salary system used by most large firms. The system was highly centralized, covering salary levels, salary ranges, raises, and bonuses. Supervisors had little...

We analyze twenty years of personnel data from one firm. The hierarchical structure is quite simple and stable. Career movements suggest that the employee's rate of learning and the firm's learning about ability are important. There are promotion 'fast tracks.' Exit rates vary little with tenure...

Personnel records are used to examine compensation, recruitment, and retention of a group of highly skilled workers: civilian scientists and engineers in U.S. Department of Defense laboratories. In contrast to those of the private sector, returns to skills were largely flat for this group from...

We develop a simple model of the effects of reputation on prices. An increasing fraction of consumers who are “naive” (less informed about quality) results in a stronger sensitivity of prices to ratings of quality. We then argue that this may be a factor in price dynamics for goods that...

We study the effects of a field experiment designed to motivate employee ideas, at a large technology company. Employees were encouraged to submit ideas on process and product improvements via an online system. In the experiment, the company randomized 19 account teams into treatment and control...

Drawing on a single large U.S. corporation's personnel records for the years 1989–93, the authors analyze an example of the kind of formal salary system used by most large firms. They find that this firm's practices were consistent with most of the important conclusions of prior empirical...

In this paper we study job design. Will an organization plan precisely how the job is to be done ex ante, or ask workers to determine the process as they go? We first model this decision and predict complementarity between these job attributes: multitasking, discretion, skills, and...

We examine the effects of performance measure properties on incentive system design, using data on incentive contracts for auto dealership managers. The data include information on five properties: two indicators of risk; two indicators of distortion; and one indicator of potential manipulation....