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Strategic communication : theory and experiment
Haan, Thomas de - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009713439
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Concern for relative standing and deception
Galanis, Spyros; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362462
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Folk retributivism and the communication confound
Nadelhoffer, Thomas; Heshmati, Saeideh; Kaplan, Deanna; … - In: Economics & philosophy 29 (2013) 2, pp. 235-261
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226507
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Communication, renegotiation, and the scope for collusion
Cooper, David J.; Kühn, Kai-Uwe - In: American economic journal : a journal of the American … 6 (2014) 2, pp. 247-278
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380461
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Lying about what you know or about what you do?
Serra-Garcia, Marta; Damme, Eric E. C. van; Potters, Jan - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 11 (2013) 5, pp. 1204-1229
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342093
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Social theories for strategic communication
Ihlen, Øyvind; Verhoeven, Piet - In: The Routledge handbook of strategic communication, (pp. 127-140). 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010468332
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Three-player trust game with insider communication
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 52 (2014) 2, pp. 576-591
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010470200
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Concern for relative standing and deception
Galanis, Spyros; Vlassopoulos, Michael - 2014
We report results from a sender-receiver deception game, which tests whether an individual's decision to deceive is influenced by a concern for relative standing in a reference group. The sender ranks six possible outcomes, each specifying a payoff for him and the receiver. A message is then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010404042
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Distorted Voronoi languages
Förster, Manuel; Riedel, Frank - 2011
In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication games of common interest when signals are …-uniformly distributed types. -- Cheap Talk ; Signaling Game ; Communication Game ; Voronoi tesselation ; Conflict of Interest …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009388067