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Optimal collusion with limited liability

Billette de Villemeur, Étienne; Flochel, Laurent; … - In: International journal of economic theory 9 (2013) 3, pp. 203-227

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792519

Market shares, R&D agreements, and the EU block exemption

Ruble, Richard; Versaevel, Bruno - In: International review of law and economics 37 (2014), pp. 15-25

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010485908

Timing vertical relationships

Billette de Villemeur, Étienne; Ruble, Richard; … - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008749104

Investment timing and vertical relationships

Billette de Villemeur, Étienne; Ruble, Richard; … - In: International journal of industrial organization 33 (2014), pp. 110-123

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010462770

R&D delegation in a duopoly with spillovers

Vencatachellum, Désiré (contributor); … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002610112

From private to public common agency

Billette de Villemeur, Étienne; Versaevel, Bruno - In: Journal of economic theory 111 (2003) 2, pp. 305-309

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001781228

Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives

Dequiedt, Vianney; Versaevel, Bruno - In: International review of law and economics 36 (2013), pp. 59-69

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221337

One lab, two firms, many possibilities : on R&D outsourcing in the biopharmaceutical industry

Billette de Villemeur, Étienne; Versaevel, Bruno - In: Journal of health economics 65 (2019), pp. 260-283

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012224616

Dynamic competition and intellectual property rights in a model of product development

Billette de Villemeur, Étienne; Ruble, Richard; … - In: Journal of economic dynamics & control 100 (2019), pp. 270-296

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012130972

On the tacit collusion equilibria of a dynamic duopoly investment game

Ruble, Richard; Versaevel, Bruno - In: Economics Bulletin 32 (2012) 4, pp. 2817-2827

This note extends the characterization of simultaneous investment (tacit collusion) equilibria in Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux (2012). Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278742