In recent years, regulatory bodies in Europe and around the world implemented Combinatorial Clock Auctions (CCA) to allocate scarce and valuable spectrum frequencies usage rights. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple. More precisely, bidders may bid...

We extend the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information in the spirit of Wilson (1977)’s ‘anticipatory equilibrium’ by introducing an additional stage in which initial contracts can be withdrawn after observation of...

We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...

Vom Ehealgorithmus und dem Fluch des Siegers, von der Verteilung von Schulplätzen bis zur Funkfrequenzauktion - im Forschungsfeld "Marktdesign" werden Regeln für Märkte entwickelt, getestet und umgesetzt. Die Walter-Adolf-Jöhr-Vorlesung von Prof. Achim Wambach gibt einen Einblick in dieses...

We analyze a two-period competitive insurance market that is characterized by the simultaneous presence of moral hazard and adverse selection with regard to consumer time preferences. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium in which patient consumers use high effort and buy an insurance...