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There are several locations, each of which is endowed with a resource that is specific to that location. Examples include coastal fisheries, oil fields, etc. Each agent will go to a single location and harvest some of the resource there. Several agents may go to each location. We assign...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011571805
There is a divisible commodity and money. Each agent has an endowment of the two goods and continuous, monotone, convex preferences over bundles. Agents may benefit from trade. An exchange rule is a mapping that, for each profile of preferences, calculates for each agent a trade that he finds...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011571810
We identify a large subdomain, D, of quasilinear economies on which any efficient exchange rule will be generically (in the Baire sense) manipulable. For generic economies outside of D, we find rules that are locally non-manipulable. The interior of the set D consists of all economies in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020281
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012175357
There are several locations, each of which is endowed with a resource that is specific to that location. Examples include coastal fisheries, oil fields, etc. Each agent will go to a single location and harvest some of the resource there. Several agents may go to each location. We assign...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012013657
There is a divisible commodity and money. Each agent has an endowment of the two goods and continuous, monotone, convex preferences over bundles. Agents may benefit from trade. An exchange rule is a mapping that, for each profile of preferences, calculates for each agent a trade that he finds...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012013658
We identify a large subdomain, D, of quasilinear economies on which any efficient exchange rule will be generically (in the Baire sense) manipulable. For generic economies outside of D, we find rules that are locally non-manipulable. The interior of the set D consists of all economies in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215299
We consider taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. We show that if a rule satisfies individual rationality, strategyproofness, constrained efficiency, weak...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208817
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012632926
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012637359