Auctions are a popular way to raise money for charities, but relatively little is known, either theoretically or empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. The small theoretical literature suggests that the all-pay auction should garner more money than winner-pay auctions. We conduct...

The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete...

This study empirically examines a sample of national wireless spectrum assignments for the period 2000-2007 to identify the sources of revenue variations. An econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per capita winning bid (per Mhz) values to auction design...

We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer-determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price-based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter...

Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of...

This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in multiple component conflicts, commonly termed 'battlefields'. In multi-battlefield conflicts, behavioral linkages across battlefields depend both on the technologies of conflict within each...

This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations...

Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main objective of this study is to analyze the effect of...

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is 'smoother' in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids...

Previous research indicates that risky and uncertain marginal returns from the public good significantly lower contributions. This paper presents experimental results illustrating that the effects of risk and uncertainty depend on the employed parameterization. Speci?cally, if the value of the...