To explore the propagation of undesirable policies in a form of populist extremism, we construct a social learning model featuring agency problems. Politicians in different countries sequentially implement a policy. Voters learn the incumbent politician's type and the desirable policy by...

Elected politicians may engage in opportunistic behavior for private benefits, which is a central problem in democratic societies. While re-election incentives can mitigate this problem, they may also induce words without actions: politicians pander to voters right before elections by proposing...

Government deficits are considered to prevail because the public is ill-informed about the cost of deficits. To examine the veracity of this statement, this experiment focused on the effect of framing on support for the financial (im)balance of a government's budget. Participants were required...

Preferences for redistribution involve concerns for the welfare of oneself and for income equality in society. Using an anchoring-vignette format, this cross-national survey finds that more concern for the welfare of oneself rather than for others leads to support for redistribution. In the...