2013. Costly mistakes have externalities: they transfer tuition waivers from high- to low-socioeconomic status students …, and increase the number of students attending college. To shed light on the mechanisms underlying mistakes, we exploit a …

We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin … compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a … the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism …

the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism versus the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (IDAM), a matching … provided while students make choices. We consider two variations of IDAM: one in which they are only informed about whether … they are tentatively accepted or not (IDAM-NC) and one in which students are additionally informed at each step of the …

about both. I find that strategic and full information increase truth-telling and stability under the Gale-Shapley mechanism … assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the …

I provide a brief introduction to the early literatures on Matching, Auctions, and Market Design.The design of matching … this, these are arenas where economic theory has directly shaped institutions ranging from the systems by which students …

. As a main motivation for these reforms the policymakers cited strategic flaws of the rules: students had strong … incentives to game the system, which caused dramatic consequences for non-strategic students. However, almost none of the new … manipulate. Simultaneously, the admission to each school became strategy-proof to a larger set of students, making the schools …

I study a college-admissions model with two need-blind colleges and heterogeneous students. In a game in which colleges … worse off but make all students and the other college better off …

We present a survey of the emerging literature on the design of matching markets. We survey the articles on discrete … admissions model where both schools and students are strategic agents, the school placement model where only students are … strategic agents and they induce an endogenous priority structure of schools over students, and finally the school choice model …

We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals …' preferences and priorities are drawn randomly. When agents' preferences are uncorrelated, then both efficiency and stability can …