agreements is informative regarding borrower risk. We proxy for credit-risk-relevant soft information using Loughran and McDonald … measures of credit risk, increased contractual uncertainty is associated with higher initial loan spreads and a greater … likelihood of using dynamic and performance pricing covenants. We then turn to examine realized credit risk over the life of the …

Information asymmetries are known in theory to lead to inefficiently low credit provision, yet empirical estimates of … to estimate welfare losses arising from asymmetric information in the market for online consumer credit. Building on … price distortions, we find only small overall welfare losses, particularly for high-credit-score borrowers …

-performers drop. The magnitude of this difference implies that an individual lender's credit allocation choices matter for aggregate … larger loans based on prior performance is not efficient. Our results have important implications for credit expansion policy …

market rates or observable firm credit risk characteristics. In this paper, we provide evidence that the appearance of … stickiness arises, in part, because the intensity of bank screening varies inversely with changes in credit market conditions and … observable firm credit risk characteristics. Our analysis demonstrates that stickiness in loan spreads does not necessarily …

of lenders not observing a borrower's true credit score but only seeing an aggregate credit category. We find that … borrower's credit score. This inference is economically significant and allows lenders to lend at a 140-basis-points lower rate … for borrowers with (unobserved to lenders) better credit scores within a credit category. While lenders infer the most …

source of credit. We aim to learn why households refuse to become clients of a bank and prefer to instead raise funds by …'s choice of the informal credit market is based not only on economic factors, but also on some institutional ones, including … financial literacy, trust in the banking sector, and credit discipline. We show that choosing the informal market is explained …