Contracts for differences are widely discussed as a cornerstone of Europe’s future electricity market design. This is a paper on CfD contract design. We summarize the dispatch and investment distortions that conventional CfDs cause, the patches that are used to overcome these shortcomings, and...

The global energy system is undergoing a major transition, and in energy planning and decision-making across governments, industry and academia, models play a crucial role. Because of their policy relevance and contested nature, the transparency and open availability of energy models and data...

This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called 'inc-dec gaming' when including flexible consumers...

In zonal electricity markets such as Europe’s, system operators rely on out-of-the-market measures to relieve network congestion within bidding zones. One such measure is “redispatching” power plants, i.e. increasing the output of a station downstream of the congestion while lowering...

This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors' costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these extensions...

The quality of electricity system modelling heavily depends on the input data used. Although a lot of data is publicly available, it is often dispersed, tedious to process and partly contains errors. We argue that a central provision of input data for modelling has the character of a public...

In zonal electricity markets, such as Europe's, system operators relieve congested power lines within bidding zones using out-of-market measures. One such measure is "redispatching" power plants, i.e. increasing the output of one power station while decreasing the output of another....

This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible...

This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these...